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Article 5

Inconceivable?
Helena Silverstein*
Thirty-two states in the United States currently enforce laws
that require parental involvement when a pregnant minor seeks
an abortion. Of these, seventeen require parental consent 1 while
fifteen require parental notification. 2 Another ten states have
passed parental involvement bills that are either currently
3
enjoined or have been found constitutionally infirm.
The typical parental involvement mandate prohibits the
performance of an abortion on a minor without parental
participation, unless the minor obtains a judge's order waiving
4
that participation. Under the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act,
for example, a physician may not perform an abortion on an
unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen without first
obtaining the informed consent of the pregnant minor as well as
one of her parents, or, if both parents are unavailable, her

* Associate Professor, Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College.
Ph.D. 1992, University of Washington. B.A. 1983, University of Pennsylvania. I
am grateful to Wayne Fishman for his encouragement and suggestions. I would
also like to thank Rebecca Tavares for her helpful comments.
1. These states are Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortions, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF (The Alan
Guttmacher Institute, New York, N.Y. & Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1, 2001, at 1,
available at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/spibPIMA.pdf. In addition to these
seventeen states, Maine allows minors to receive counseling instead of obtaining
parental consent or court authorization for abortion. Id.
2. These states are Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
West Virginia. Id. While Oklahoma is included among the states requiring
parental notification, that state's law does not, strictly speaking, mandate such
notice. Instead, the law states: "Any person who performs an abortion on a minor
without parental consent or knowledge shall be liable for the cost of any
subsequent medical treatment such minor might require because of the abortion."
Id.
3. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, and New Mexico. Id. In addition to these ten
states, Ohio's parental consent legislation has also been enjoined, but the state's
parental notification law is currently enforced. See id.
4. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206 (2001).
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guardian.5 However, if the minor does not wish to or cannot
obtain the consent of either parent or her guardian, she may
petition the court for a bypass of the requisite consent. The
statute specifies:
[T]he court of common pleas of the judicial district in which
the applicant resides of [sic] in which the abortion is sought
shall, upon petition or motion, after an appropriate hearing,
authorize a physician to perform the abortion if the court
determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of
giving informed consent 6to the proposed abortion, and has, in
fact, given such consent.
Furthermore, under the Pennsylvania statute, even upon finding
that the minor is not mature and capable of giving informed
consent, the court shall authorize the abortion if it "determines
that the performance of an abortion would be in the best interests
7
of the woman."
Like the Pennsylvania statute, nearly all parental
involvement mandates currently in effect have incorporated a
judicial bypass option into their statutory provisions.8 This is due
to U.S. Supreme Court rulings that have overturned parental
consent requirements that fail to incorporate such a bypass
provision.9 As some members of the Court have reasoned, because

5. See id. § 3206(a).
6. Id. § 3206(c).
7. Id. § 3206(d).
8. Utah and Maryland are exceptions. Under the Utah statute, physicians
must notify the minor's parents "if possible." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1999).
This statute was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of an immature
minor. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 398-99 (1981). Maryland also
mandates parental notification, but physicians may waive notice upon finding that
the minor is mature or that notification would not be in her best interest. See MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (2000).
9. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 52-53 (1976)
(overturning a Missouri one-parent consent statute); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1),
428 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1976) (remanding the question of a Massachusetts twoparent consent statute to the district court for proceedings consistent with the
finding that interpreting the statute to permit a minor, capable of giving informed
consent, to get a court order allowing abortion without the requisite parental
consent could avoid a constitutional question); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 11), 443
U.S. 622, 622 (1979) (overturning a Massachusetts two-parent consent statute with
a judicial bypass provision); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron 1), 462
U.S. 416, 416-18 (1983) (overturning a one-parent consent statute). The Supreme
Court has not decided whether parental notification laws must be accompanied by
a bypass provision. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I1), 497 U.S.
502, 510 (1990) ('[A]lthough our cases have required bypass procedures for
parental consent statutes, we have not decided whether parental notice statutes
must contain such procedures." (citations omitted)). The Court has, however,
commented that mandated notification does not appear to place the same types of
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'unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a
minor' ... the constitutional protection against unjustified state
intrusion into the process of deciding whether or not to bear a
child extends to pregnant minors as well as adult women." 10 A
pregnant minor's right to abortion, although not subject to the
same level of protection as that of an adult woman, may be
regulated only when the state's interest in doing so is significant."
Additionally, regulation of abortion is invalid when it imposes an
"undue burden" on women. 12 "A finding of an undue burden," as
members of Court have explained, "is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."'13 It has been further explained that
imposing an "absolute parental veto" on a minor's decision to
choose abortion creates an undue burden, 14 while regulations5
providing a meaningful bypass alternative eliminate this burden.'
Although initially finding parental involvement statutes to be
unconstitutional,' 6 the Supreme Court has on six separate
occasions since 1983 upheld mandated parental participation in

barriers to abortion as consent. See, e.g., Matheson, 450 U.S. at 409 (noting that
mandated consent demands parental approval and could amount to a veto, whereas
under a "mere requirement of parental notice," a minor may still obtain her
abortion even without parental approval).
10. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1990) (opinion of Stevens, J.)
(quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642).
11. See Akron I, 462 U.S. at 427-28 n.10 (noting that "the Court repeatedly has
recognized that, in view of the unique status of children under the law, the States
have a 'significant' interest in certain abortion regulations aimed at protecting
children 'that is not present in the case of an adult" (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at
75)).
12. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-75 (1992)
(opinion of O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J.).
13. Id. at 877.
14. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 639 (finding that states may "not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy")
(opinion of Powell, J., who announced the judgment of the court); see also Danforth,
428 U.S. at 74 (holding that "the State may not impose a blanket provision ... as a
condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her
pregnancy").
15. In parental consent for abortion cases, a minor petitioning for a waiver of
consent must be granted her request upon demonstrating "(1) that she is mature
enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation
with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is
not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her
best interests." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (opinion ofPowell, J., who announced
the judgment of the court).
16. See cases cited supra note 9.
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abortions for minors. 17 Members of the Court have consistently
referred to parental and family interests that ought to be balanced
against the minor's stake in privacy:
[T]he demonstration of commitment to the child through the
assumption of personal, financial, or custodial responsibility
may give the natural parent a stake in the relationship with

[T~he
the child rising to the level of a liberty interest ....
family has a privacy interest in the upbringing and education
of children and the intimacies of the marital relationship

by the Constitution against undue state
which is protected
8
interference.'
States frequently cite the family privacy interest in justifying
For example, Michigan's
parental involvement legislation.
parental consent provision is known as the "Parental Rights
Restoration Act," indicating the legislature's intent to keep
parents involved.' 9 Alabama's parental consent statute offers the
following motivation for its legislation:
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this parental
consent provision to further the important and compelling
state interests of: (1) protecting minors against their own
immaturity, (2) fostering the family structure and preserving
it as a viable social unit, and (3) protecting the rights of
parents to20 rear children who are members of their
household.
State legislatures thus seek to protect parents' rights to be
involved in their minor daughters' abortion decisions.
State efforts to protect parental rights concerning their
2
daughters' abortion decisions have engendered much debate. '
17. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297-99 (1997) (upholding
Montana's one-parent notification statute with a judicial bypass provision); Casey,
505 U.S. at 899-901 (upholding Pennsylvania's one-parent consent statute with a
judicial bypass provision); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 51920 (1990) (upholding Ohio's one-parent notification statute with a judicial bypass
provision); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 455 (1990) (upholding Minnesota's
two-parent notification statute with a judicial bypass provision); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983) (upholding Missouri's oneparent consent statute with a judicial bypass provision); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (upholding Utah's one-parent notification statute).
18. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 446 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
19. MICH. COMP. LAws § 722.901 (1993).
20. ALA. CODE § 26-21-1(a) (1992).
21. Compare, e.g., Maggie O'Shaughnessy, The Worst of Both Worlds? Parental
Involvement Requirements and the Privacy Rights of Mature Minors, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1731,1734 (1996) (arguing that mandated "parental involvement does not seem
to have the effect of facilitating better-reasoned abortion decisions"), with Sandra
M. Secrest, Minors' Rights to Abortion-Are Parental Notice and Consent Laws
Justified? 66 U. DET. L. REV. 691, 692 (1989) (arguing that one-parent involvement
statutes, accompanied by a judicial bypass procedure, serve state interests in
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This Essay joins the debate by presenting three fictitious judicial
opinions based on an equally fictitious state law that requires
parental consent when a minor chooses pregnancy rather than
abortion. These imagined judicial opinions are modeled after very
real opinions that have been issued by various state appellate
courts. Because of the parallels between existing parental consent
requirements for minors seeking abortions and laws that would
mandate similar requirements for minors wishing to continue
their pregnancies, these invented judicial rulings mirror the
realities of, and controversies surrounding, current court rulings.

Recognizing the fundamental importance of parental rights,
the state legislature of Statesylvania passed the Parental Consent
for Pregnancy Act in May 2001. Modeled upon statutes requiring
parental consent for abortion, 22 the Statesylvania law includes a
judicial bypass provision that allows a minor to carry the
pregnancy to term, and forego an abortion, without the consent of
her parents. It is this statute that is at issue in the following
23
ruling handed down by the Supreme Court of Statesylvania.

protecting minors and promoting parental involvement).
22. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.903 (1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206
(1992); ALA CODE §§ 26-21-1 to -8 (1997); WIS. STAT. § 48.375 (2000). Michigan's
parental consent legislation, for example, establishes the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person shall not perform an
abortion on a minor without first obtaining the written consent of the
If a
minor and 1 of the parents or the legal guardian of the minor ....
parent or the legal guardian is not available or refuses to give his or her
consent, or if the minor elects not to seek consent of a parent or the legal
guardian, the minor may petition the probate court pursuant to section 4
for a waiver of the parental consent requirement of this section.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.903.
23. For parallel rulings in cases dealing with minors who have been denied
their petitions to bypass parental involvement in their abortion decisions, see, e.g.,
In re Anonymous, 770 So. 2d 1107, 1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (reversed and waiver
granted); In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429, 432-33 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (reversed
and waiver granted); In re Anonymous, 711 So. 2d 475, 476 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)
(remanded with instructions to grant waiver); In re Complaint of Jane Doe, 96 Ohio
App. 3d 435, 437 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (reversed and waiver granted); In re
Complaint of Jane Doe, 83 Ohio App. 3d 98, 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (reversed
with order to waive parental notification); In re Jane Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d 300, 301
(Tex. 2000) (vacated and remanded to determine whether parental notification
would lead to abuse and whether minor was sufficiently mature and well-informed
to make the abortion decision); In re Jane Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Tex. 2000)
(vacated and remanded to determine if the minor was sufficiently well-informed to
consent to an abortion).
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IN RE JANE DOE
SUPREME COURT OF STATESYLVANIA
29 N.S.2d 375
APRIL 1, 2002, DELIVERED

Chief Justice X, joined by 6 justices, delivered the opinion of
the Court.
This appeal involves the denial of a pregnant minor's
application to waive Statesylvania's mandated parental consent
requirement for pregnancy.
The minor filed her petition on March 21, 2002, pursuant to
Statesylvania Code § 22-34-2 (2001). In filing the petition, the
minor indicated her desire to carry her pregnancy to term without
the requisite consent from her parents. After a hearing, the trial
court denied the minor's petition, finding that she was not
sufficiently mature and well-informed to continue with the
pregnancy absent the consent of her parents, and, therefore, that
24
pursuing the pregnancy was not in her best interest.
We conclude, after reviewing the record, that the trial court
did not err in its denial of the minor's petition.
I.
Statesylvania's Parental Consent for Pregnancy Act was
enacted by the State Legislature on May 14, 2001, and took effect
on September 3, 2001. Section 22-34-2(a) protects a parent's right
to demand that his or her daughter undergo an abortion
procedure, rather than continue with the pregnancy. The Act
mandates that abortion providers perform abortions on
unemancipated pregnant minors under the age of sixteen at the
request of one of her parents or her legal guardian, even if the
minor indicates a desire to proceed with the pregnancy. 25
However, abortion providers may refuse to perform an abortion if
the procedure is deemed medically unsafe for the minor or if the
minor requests a judicial hearing seeking a waiver of the parental
24. Appellate court rulings on denials of bypass requests of parental consent in
abortion cases often begin in this manner. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 660 So. 2d
1022, 1022-23 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) ('Following ...proceedings, the trial court
denied the minor's petition, stating in its order that 'the minor is not mature and
well informed enough to make the abortion decision and the performance of the
abortion without parental consent is not in the best interest of the minor."').
25. There are no such statutes in existence in the United States.
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consent requirement.

Should the minor request a judicial hearing, she has one
week to petition the juvenile court, either in the county in which
26
she resides or the county where the abortion is to be performed.
The Act provides that the required parental consent for continuing
pregnancy shall be waived if the court finds either:
(1) That the minor is mature and well-informed enough to
carry the pregnancy to term without parental consent; or
(2) That pursuing pregnancy would be in the best interest of
27
the minor.
The Statesylvania Code further provides that judicial
proceedings for a waiver of parental consent to pursue pregnancy
must be expeditious and "given precedence over other pending
matters," and that the court shall advise the minor that she has a
right to court-appointed counsel. Statesylvania Code § 22-34-2(e)(f). 28

26. In statutes requiring parental consent for abortion, it is typical for minors
to be given the right to petition the court in a timely manner in one of two counties.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(a), (e) (1992). The Alabama Code states:
A minor who elects not to seek or does not or cannot for any reason, obtain
consent from either of her parents or legal guardian, may petition, on her
own behalf the juvenile court, or the court of equal standing, in the county
in which the minor resides or in the county in which the abortion is to be
performed for a waiver of the consent requirement of this chapter....
Court proceedings shall be given such precedence over other pending
matters as is necessary to insure that the court may reach a decision
promptly, but in no case, except as provided herein, shall the court fail to
rule within 72 hours of the time the petition is filed, Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays excluded.
Id.
27. Statutes requiring parental consent or notification for abortion incorporate
similar language. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(0 (1992) ('The required consent
shall be waived if the court finds either: (1) That the minor is mature and wellinformed enough to make the abortion decision on her own; or (2) That performance
of the abortion would be in the best interest of the minor.").
28. For an example of a similar statute, see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(e)(0(1) (2001), which provides:
The pregnant woman may participate in proceedings in the court on her
own behalf and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to assist her.
The court shall, however, advise her that she has a right to court
appointed counsel .... Court proceedings under this section shall be
confidential and shall be given such precedence over other pending
matters as will ensure that the court may reach a decision promptly and
without delay in order to serve the best interests of the pregnant
woman ....
See also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.904 (1993) ('The probate court shall, upon its
first contact with a minor seeking a waiver of parental consent under this act,
provide the minor with notice of the minor's right to ...Court appointment of an
attorney or guardian ad litem.").
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II.
Jane Doe, a pregnant, unemancipated minor, filed a petition
to waive the state's mandated parental consent requirement. The
trial court appointed counsel to represent Doe and held a hearing
within the requisite timeframe. At the hearing, the petitioner
testified concerning her pregnancy and her perceptions of carrying
the pregnancy to term.
Jane Doe is fourteen years old and a sophomore in high
school. She lives with her parents, has never held a job, receives
B's and C's in school, and is a member of two extra-curricular
organizations. She testified that she had sex with her fifteen-yearold boyfriend only a few times, and that, upon learning of her
pregnancy, he indicated that he would not marry her or help raise
29
the child should she pursue the pregnancy.
When asked whether she knew about the physical and
medical effects of carrying a pregnancy to term, Doe said the
following:
I know I'll get fat, that's for sure. And I've been nauseous for a
month. I heard that people get cravings for weird things like
pickles and ice cream, but that sounds gross to me right now.
I stopped getting my period, which is great, but I guess that's
supposed to come back after I give birth.
Asked by the trial judge whether she would consider having
an amniocentesis during the pregnancy, the minor said she had
not considered it one way or the other. Asked whether she was
aware of the potential risks associated with pregnancy, such as
preeclampsia or pregnancy-related diabetes, the minor stated that
she wasn't "too worried" because she would be able "to get out of
gym class for the remainder of the year." Asked whether she was
aware of the difficulties associated with giving birth, including

29. For testimony offered by a minor seeking a waiver of parental consent in an
abortion case, see, e.g., In re Anonymous, 650 So. 2d 923 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). A
court described one minor's testimony as follows:
The minor testified that she is 17 years old; is in the eleventh grade;
makes A's, B's, and Gs; and is a cheerleader. She works three days a week
teaching young children gymnastics. She testified that with the money
she earns she helps pay for her car, saves for college, and has some
spending money. Her plans for the future include studying physical
therapy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham.... The minor's
boyfriend, who she says is the father, is 18 years old, attends UAB, and is
currently employed. The minor says that he has stated that he would
support her "100 percent" in whatever decision she made regarding her
pregnancy.
Id. at 924.
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she
breech births, caesarian sections, and tearing, Doe stated that
30
didn't "like to think about the bad things that might happen."
Doe testified that she wants to pursue the pregnancy:
I love to play with kids. I don't want to go to college, school is
so boring. I've babysat a few times for my neighbor's six-yearold and he's really cute. I want a kid of my own. I never had
any brothers or sisters. My parents don't want me31to have this
kid, but I'll show them I can be good at something.
Asked how she would afford to raise the child, Doe stated
that she knew of some mothers who receive "food stamps and
money from the government." She further stated, "I know that my
boyfriend says he won't help, but once he sees how cute the kid is
and, you know, that it's, like, his kid, what's he gonna do? And I
know my parents won't let their own grandkid starve."
Doe testified that she would drop out of school to raise her
child, that she has changed diapers before, and that she would
never consider giving up the child for adoption. "I hate the idea
that there's a little me running around out there and not knowing
who it is." Asked whether she has views about the morality of
abortion, she said, "Well, it's not like I think I'll go to hell or
anything. I just don't like the idea of it."
In light of the minor's testimony, the juvenile court judge
concluded:
While the minor may show some signs of maturity, she is not
sufficiently mature to accept the responsibilities of
30. Compare this testimony with the following description from a proceeding in
which a minor sought a waiver of parental consent for abortion:
[The minor] testified that there are two types of possible emotional
problems after an abortion-post-abortion trauma syndrome, which
usually involves feelings of guilt, stress, and regret, and post-abortion
psychosis. She stated that psychosis is usually experienced by women who
The minor
have had mental health problems before the abortion....
"[The doctor] does a pelvic
testified about the abortion procedure:
examination to see where the uterus is located and the size. Then he
inserts a speculum to open you up and look at the cervix. He injects
lidocaine into the cervix to numb it. Then he uses a vacuum aspiration to
remove the embryo."
In re Anonymous, No. 2001070, 2001 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 361, at *20-21 (Ala. Civ.
App. July 27, 2001) (Murdock, J., concurring).
31. Compare with the following description of a minor who was denied a waiver
of parental consent for abortion by a trial judge:
The minor is 16 years of age, has never been married, and is a junior in
high school. She is attending a local college this summer to get college
credit, has gained an early acceptance to that college, and will graduate
early from high school. She has accepted a job beginning in January after
she graduates, in the field in which she plans to study.
In re Anonymous, No. 2000932, 2001 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 312, at *1 (Ala. Civ.
App. June 15, 2001).
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motherhood.
In particular, she demonstrates minimal
knowledge about the medical and physical aspects of
pregnancy, and perhaps even less about the responsibilities
Furthermore, pursuing this
and burdens of parenting.
pregnancy would not be in the best interests of this fourteenyear-old girl. Being only nine weeks into this pregnancy, an
abortion is, medically speaking, safer for Doe than carrying
the pregnancy to term. 32 In addition, Doe has no prospects for
marriage or support from her family; she has not finished high
school; she has no funds to support the child or employment
experience that would allow her to become gainfully employed.
In short, should this girl give birth, it would be the classic case
would be
of a child seeking to raise a child. 33 And the burden
34
on the taxpayers to fund this ill-advised venture.

32. Compare with the following trial court order in the case of a minor who was
denied a waiver of parental consent for abortion:
Petitioner has been denied the opportunity to engage in pre-op counseling
with the physician, evaluate the physician or interview and question the
physician. Likewise the physician hasn't evaluated petitioner or furnished
information to petitioner[,] so the court finds that the petitioner is not
mature or well-informed and that abortion at this time under the proposed
circumstances is contra to her best interests.
In re Anonymous, No. 1001488, 2001 Ala. LEXIS 202, at *6 (Ala. June 1, 2001).
33. See, e.g., Sherri A. Jayson, "Loving Infertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 18-31
to Help Have Baby. $6,500 Plus Expenses and a Gift": Should We Regulate the Use
of Assisted Reproductive Technologies by Older Women?, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
287, 316-17 (2001) C'Teenagers, children themselves, require their parents'
guidance and supervision, and, thus, lack the knowledge and emotional strength to
Teenagers and even women in their early 20s hardly
raise a child capably ....
have the requisite level of financial and emotional stability or maturity to raise
healthy children."); Judy Nichols, Square Mile Booms with Teen Births, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Oct. 29, 1995, at Al ("We end up with children having children, women
who have a very hard time pulling themselves out of poverty, mothers with less
parenting skills who don't have the support of another partner, more latchkey kids,
more youth violence and gangs.... ); Commentary: Teen Parenthoodout of Control,
HARTFORD COURANT, May 28, 1995, at E2 ('Welfare rolls are swollen with jobless,
aimless and undereducated children having children, particularly in urban centers.
Life generally turns out to be bleak for both the mother and child, who are most
often abandoned by the father.").
34. Studies have suggested that the financial costs of adolescent childbearing
are, in part, shouldered by society. According to one study:
The social costs of having large numbers of adolescents give birth are
heavy. Many teenagers will require financial assistance from public
In addition, adolescents'
sources in order to support their children ....
higher risk of prenatal and perinatal complications translates into higher
medical costs for themselves and their children. These medical costs are
often borne by society, as are the costs of any social services that an
adolescent mother or her children may require.
Jeanne Marecek, Consequences of Adolescent Childbearing and Abortion, in
ADOLESCENT ABORTION 96, 108 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986).
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III.
Before turning to the merits of this case, it is important to
note that we are not called upon by the petitioner to rule on the
constitutionality of the Parental Consent for Pregnancy Act. The
Act mirrors parental consent for abortion statutes that have been
upheld as constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.3 5 The Act
thus contains the safeguards that have protected similar statutes
from being condemned as unconstitutional. 36 But whether, in the
end, this statute will avoid such a fate is a question that must be
left for another day.
As we have previously held, statutes passed by our
Legislature are presumed constitutional, and constitutional
challenges should only be considered when properly raised and
37
accompanied by appropriate pleadings.
IV.
Denials of waiver requests must be examined on a case-bycase basis. When so doing, appellate review must assess a trial
judge's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 38 Abuse of
discretion
"connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies
that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable."... Above all, a reviewing court should be
guided by a presumption that the findings of a trial court are
correct, since the trial judge "is best able to view the witnesses
and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections,
35. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(upholding as constitutional Pennsylvania's one-parent consent requirement for
abortion that incorporates a judicial bypass option).
36. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297 (1997) (upholding Montana's
one-parent notification statute with a judicial bypass provision); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 461 (1990) (upholding Minnesota's two-parent notification
statute with a judicial bypass provision); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497
U.S. 502, 519-20 (1990) (upholding Ohio's one-parent notification statute with a
judicial bypass provision); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
490-93 (1983) (upholding Missouri's one-parent consent statute with a judicial
bypass provision).
37. See In re Jane Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 2000) ("We have previously
cautioned that the constitutionality of a statute should be considered only when the
question is properly raised and such determination is necessary and appropriate to
a decision in the case."); see also In re Anonymous, 515 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1987) ("lIlt has been held that the constitutionality of a law will not be
considered on appeal unless essential to the decision of the actual case before the
court.").
38. See In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1991) (applying the
abuse of discretion standard to a trial judge's denial of a minor's request to waive
parental notification of abortion).
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and use these observations
in weighing the credibility of the
39
proffered testimony."
Applying the abuse of discretion standard to the instant case,
we find that the trial court did not err in denying the minor's
petition for a waiver because there is no evidence that the minor is
even remotely informed about pregnancy or parenthood or that
pursuing the pregnancy would be in her best interest. Indeed,
were we to find this minor mature and well-informed, it would be
40
difficult to imagine a minor who would fail to meet this standard.
Likewise, were we to find that having a child was in this minor's
best interest, there would be few minors who would be unable to
pass this standard.
AFFIRMED.
Justice Y, dissenting.
In protecting the right of parents to raise their children, the
court today, ironically and with grave consequences, neglects a
more fundamental consideration:
the life of the unborn fetus.
Because I would not hold that safeguarding a parent's right to
guide the upbringing of his or her child means granting a parent
the authority to terminate the life of his or her own unborn
grandchild, I strongly dissent.
On first glance, this law may appear to be constitutional
because it mirrors what are perceived to be analogous laws-those
laws that mandate parental consent for abortion. But there is a
fundamental disanalogy between requiring parental consent for
abortion and requiring the same for pregnancy. The confusion
arises because parental consent for abortion laws are purported to
be protective of parental rights. 41 But in truth, those laws are

39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Compare with the appellate court conclusion in a case overturning a trial
court's denial of a minor's petition to waive parental consent for abortion: "We can
safely say, having considered the record, that, should this minor not meet the
criteria for 'maturity' under the statute, it is difficult to imagine one who would."
In re Anonymous, 515 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
41. In a case upholding Minnesota's parental notification statute, Justice
Stevens reasoned, "Three separate but related interests-the interest in the welfare
of the pregnant minor, the interest of the parents, and the interest of the family
unit- are relevant to our consideration of the constitutionality of ... the two-parent
notification requirement." Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444; see also Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979) (opinion of Powell, J.) (indicating that states
give deference to parental control and involvement).
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designed to protect the potential life of the unborn child. 42 It is
only because of the contentious and political debate over abortion
that state legislatures frame parental consent for abortion laws as
"parental rights bills" rather than as "right to life bills."
Ironically, this "parental rights" framing provides the
justification in the present case for supporting a bill that allows
the killing of innocent human lives.
But once we see that
requiring parental consent for abortion is really aimed at
advancing the fundamental right to life, the analogy falls apart.
When the presumed analogy is revealed to be false, we can see
that the state interest in "parental rights" is far outweighed by the
state's compelling interest in safeguarding the sanctity of human
life.
Justice Z, dissenting.
I disagree with the majority decision and respectfully dissent.
For entirely different reasons than Justice Y, I would find the
Parental Consent for Pregnancy Act unconstitutional and allow
Jane Doe to proceed with her pregnancy over her parent's
objections.
The majority is correct in affirming that statutes passed by
our Legislature
are presumed
constitutional
and that
constitutional challenges should only be considered when properly
raised.
But it is also true that when consideration of the
constitutionality of a law is "essential" to deciding the case before
the court, such consideration should be undertaken. 43 Such is the
case here.
The Parental Consent for Pregnancy Act is an
unconstitutional infringement on the right to privacy protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 That
right to privacy has been found to protect many things, including
42. Even though statutes requiring parental involvement in abortion decisions
do not make explicit reference to protecting the fetus, it is apparently possible to
infer legislative intent to protect the life of the unborn. Such an inference was
drawn by four justices of the Alabama Supreme Court in 1998:
[I]t seems clear that the Legislature intended, in adopting the Parental
Consent Statute, to preserve the life of the unborn, and that it deliberately
was doing what it could within the constraints of the Federal Constitution,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, to accomplish
that purpose.
In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 502-03 (Ala. 1998).
43. See In re Anonymous, 515 So. 2d at 1256.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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decisions concerning procreation, contraception, and abortion. 45
While a minor female is not granted the same level of
constitutional protection as adult females, her young age does not
place her fully beyond the reach of constitutional guarantees. 46 In
fact, with respect to a decision concerning childbirth, it would be
difficult to overstate the importance of protecting a minor's rights.
Whether protecting her choice of abortion or childbirth, "there are
few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an
important decision will have consequences so grave and
47
indelible."
By enacting the Parental Consent for Pregnancy Act, the
Statesylvania Legislature has placed parental rights over and
above the right of a young woman to control her own body.
Indeed, the Legislature has given parents the right to veto, with a
judge's permission, their daughter's decision to give birth. This
goes to the very heart of liberty, authorizing physical and
emotional invasion of personal autonomy. This invasion will
produce irreversible consequences that may haunt a woman
Liberty must extend to cover "the
throughout her life.
quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-directing decision
whether to carry a fetus to term." 48 When it does not-and it does
not in this case-we forfeit the fundamental right to personal
autonomy.
Some might say that this law gives parents no greater control
over their daughters' bodies than do laws that mandate parental
consent for abortion, and that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld
as constitutional such mandates as long as they are accompanied
by a judicial bypass alternative. This is, no doubt, true. But those
laws, I would argue, also impose unconstitutional burdens on a
young woman's right to privacy. As the California Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he decision whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy
45. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process and privacy protection to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (extending to unmarried individuals the right to decide
whether to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(recognizing a married couple's constitutional right to decide whether or not to use
contraceptive devices); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating the
right to reproduce to be "one of the basic civil rights of man").
46. See Beflotti II, 443 U.S. at 633 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)).
47. Id. at 642. The Supreme Court made this point with respect only to the
right of abortion. See id.
48. Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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has such a substantial effect on a pregnant minor's control
over her personal bodily integrity, has such serious long-term
consequences in determining her life choices, is so central to
the preservation of her ability to define and adhere to her
ultimate values regarding the meaning of human existence
and life, and (unlike many other choices)
is a decision that
49
cannot be postponed until adulthood.
Applying this logic, I would conclude that a minor's decision
whether to continue or terminate her own pregnancy is a protected
privacy interest, and an interest intruded upon by parental
involvement mandates. 50 Simply because the U.S. Supreme Court
has wrongly concluded otherwise does not mean we should make
the same error in the context of pregnancy.
There is no right more important than the right to selfdetermination. Self-determination is impossible without the right
to control one's own body. Whether in the context of forcing a
young woman to abort a fetus or to proceed with an unwanted
pregnancy, mandated parental consent laws are not only
misguided, but also fundamental and unconstitutional intrusions
upon a young woman's liberty and privacy.
With this in mind, I respectfully dissent.

49. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 816 (Cal. 1997) (holding
that California's parental consent to abortion statute violates the right to privacy
afforded under the state constitution).
50. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989) (holding that Florida's
parental consent to abortion statute violates the right to privacy protected by the
state constitution).

